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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
 Joanne Nicole Christofferson appeals from the judgment entered upon 
her guilty plea to felony vehicular manslaughter.  On appeal Christofferson 
claims the district court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for 
additional defense services pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 12.2.   
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
Christofferson was driving east on U.S. Highway 30.  (R., pp. 14-17, 27-
29.)  She crossed the centerline and drove into the westbound lane.  (R., pp. 14-
17.)  Christofferson crashed her car into a motorcycle ridden by Staci Shyrock.  
(R., p. 15.)  Ms. Shyrock flew off her motorcycle and landed on the pavement.  
(R., p. 17.)  Christofferson crashed her car into a fence.  (Id.)  Christofferson was 
transported by an ambulance to the hospital.  (R., p. 15.)  The crash killed Ms. 
Shyrock.  (R., p. 15.)   
At the scene, the officers found a glass pipe with white methamphetamine 
residue in Christofferson’s purse.  (R., pp. 15-16.)  They also found pills in a 
prescription bottle.  (Id.)  The prescription was not in Christofferson’s name.  (Id.)   
Prior to Christofferson’s crash, a witness observed Christofferson driving 
all over the road.  (R., pp. 16-17.)  The witness was afraid Christofferson was 
going to hit his car.  (Id.)  Another witness also reported seeing a cell phone in 
Christofferson’s hand right after the crash.  (R., p. 15.)   
At the hospital, Christofferson admitted to smoking marijuana before she 
drove.  (R., p. 16.)  Christofferson also reported that she used methamphetamine 
 
 2 
and prescription pills earlier that day.  (R., p. 32.)  Hospital staff found a 
methamphetamine pipe on Christofferson.  (R., p. 32.)   
The state charged Christofferson with felony vehicular manslaughter.  (R., 
pp. 55-56, 117-118.)  Christofferson pled guilty and the district court ordered a 
presentence investigation report, including an I.C. § 19-2524 mental health 
assessment.  (R., pp. 115-116, 119; see also PSI, pp. 35-49.)  Christofferson 
filed an ex parte motion for additional defense services pursuant to Idaho 
Criminal Rule 12.2.  (R., pp. 128-130.)  Specifically, Christofferson represented 
she had a “significant and complicated mental health history” with “potential” 
diagnoses and she requested $5,000 to $10,000 to retain the services of a 
forensic psychologist to conduct a “comprehensive psychological evaluation to 
assist for mitigation purposes at sentencing.”  (Id.)  The district court denied 
Christofferson’s motion for additional defense services because a mental health 
screening and, if necessary, an evaluation were already ordered as part of 
Christofferson’s pre-sentence investigation.  (R., pp. 135-140.)   
As part of the pre-sentencing investigation a GAIN-Recommendation and 
Referral Summary was conducted.  (PSI, pp. 35-46.)  A “§ 19-2524 DHW Mental 
Examination Report” was also conducted.  (PSI, pp. 47-49.)  At sentencing, 
Christofferson’s counsel argued that the “§ 19-2524 DHW Mental Examination 
Report” did not comply with the statutory requirements.  (2/26/16 Tr., p. 71, L. 24 
– p. 77, L. 3.)  However, Christofferson, through her counsel, told the district 
court that she did not want the mental health evaluation.  (2/26/16 Tr., p. 76, Ls. 
11-17, p. 85, L. 17 – p. 86, L. 5.)   
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THE COURT:  So I’m a little confused.  
 
MR. KUMM:  So am I. 
 
THE COURT:  19-2524, you have had this PSI since approximately 
December 30th, and you talked to your client about 19-2524.  This 
is the first I have heard of you objecting that that wasn’t done, but 
you have talked with your client.  She says, no, I don’t want it.  So 
I’m a little confused as to what you want.  
 
MR. KUMM:  Yeah, well, so am I. Your Honor. Like I said, I just 
want to express what my client’s wishes are.  
 
 
(2/26/16 Tr., p. 84, L. 21 – p. 85, L. 7.)  The district court concluded that based, 
upon the I.C. § 19-2524 requirements, Christofferson should have been referred 
to the Department of Health and Welfare for a full evaluation, but that there was 
sufficient mental health information to proceed with sentencing.  (2/26/16 Tr., p. 
95, L. 24 – p. 96, L. 16.)   
At the sentencing hearing the state recommended ten years with seven 
years fixed.  (2/26/16 Tr., p. 60, L. 21 – p. 61, L. 9.)  Christofferson’s counsel 
gave a variety of recommendations.  (2/26/16 Tr., p. 80, Ls. 13-20, p. 84, Ls. 6-
17, p. 96, L. 24 – p. 97, L. 13.)  He recommended one year of incarceration, or 
that the court retain jurisdiction, followed by a period or probation for four years.  
(Id.)  He also recommended the court place Christofferson in a “problem-solving 
court” like Mental Health Court.  (Id.)   
The district court examined the presentence investigation, the GAIN 
assessment and the I.C. § 19-2524 assessment, and the letters and the 
comments from the victim’s family and Christofferson’s family.  (2/26/16 Tr., p. 
104, L. 22 – p. 113, L. 9.)  The district court entered judgment and sentenced 
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Christofferson to ten years with five years fixed.  (2/26/16 Tr., p. 105, L. 13 – p. 





Christofferson states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. 
Christofferson’s Idaho Criminal Rule 12.2 motion for additional 
defense services?   
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Christofferson failed to show the district court abused its discretion 
when it denied her Idaho Criminal Rule 12.2 motion for additional defense 





Christofferson Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion  
 
A. Introduction 
 The district court denied Cristofferson’s Idaho Criminal Rule 12.2 motion 
for a mental health evaluation because Idaho Code § 19-2524 already provided 
for a mental health screening and, if necessary, an evaluation as part of the 
presentence investigation.  (R. pp. 136-138.)  On appeal Christofferson argues 
the district court abused its discretion because the purpose of the requested 
evaluation was to assist Christofferson prepare her defense, whereas an Idaho 
Code § 19-2524 screening and evaluation are “mainly for the benefit of the 
district court.”  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 18-19.)  Christofferson’s argument on 
appeal fails.   
While the underlying purposes of an Idaho Code § 19-2524 evaluation 
and an evaluation conducted pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 12.2 may, in some 
cases, be different, Christofferson fails to articulate how an actual mental health 
evaluation prepared pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2524 would differ from the one 
she requested pursuant to her 12.2 motion.  Both would result in an evaluation of 
her mental health for use at sentencing.  Even if there was a difference between 
the two, the district court’s denial of Christofferson’s Rule 12.2 motion did not 
amount to an abuse of discretion under the facts of this case.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“Denial of a request for expert or investigative assistance will not be 
disturbed absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion by rendering 
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a decision which is clearly erroneous and unsupported by the circumstances of 
the case.”  State v. Brackett, 160 Idaho 619, 377 P.3d 1082, 1097 (Ct. App. 
2016, review denied Aug. 5, 2016); see also State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 395, 
648 P.2d 203, 207 (1982); State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 392, 825 P.2d 482, 
489 (1992); State v. Haynes, 159 Idaho 36, 41, 355 P.3d 1266, 1271 (2015) 
(district court held magistrate court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 
defendant’s Idaho Criminal Rule 12.2 motion). 
“When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry.  The sequence of the inquiry is (1) whether the 
lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court 
acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any 
legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached 
its decision by an exercise of reason.”  State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 
P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989) (citation omitted); see also Brown, 121 Idaho at 392, 
825 P.2d at 489. 
 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Denied 
Christofferson’s Motion For A Psychological Evaluation Pursuant To Idaho 
Criminal Rule 12.2 
 
After Christofferson pled guilty to felony vehicular manslaughter, she 
moved for additional defense services pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 12.2.  (R., 
pp. 128-130.)  Idaho Criminal Rule 12.2 allows a district court to order public 
funds to pay for investigative, expert, or other services that are necessary for the 
defendant’s defense.  I.C.R. 12.2(a).  The defendant is required to include the 
scope and details of the services requested, the reasons the requested services 
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are “relevant and necessary to the defense,” and information regarding the 
proposed providers of the service.  See I.C.R. 12.2.  Further, the district court 
must find the defendant is indigent as set forth in I.C. § 19-854 before the district 
court may order public funds to pay for the requested services.  I.C.R. 12.2(c).  
Here, Christofferson moved to hire an expert to conduct a psychological 
evaluation “to assist for mitigation purposes at sentencing.”  (R., pp. 128-130). 
Christofferson requested $5,000 to $10,000 for the psychological evaluation.  
(R., pp. 128-130).  
The district court entered a written order denying Christofferson’s motion 
for additional defense services, finding the “additional services would be 
duplicative of what has already been ordered.”  (R., pp. 135-140.)  Specifically, 
the court reasoned: 
The Court finds the request for these additional services would be 
duplicative of what has already been ordered.  Pursuant to Idaho 
Code (IC) § 19-2524 any defendant who has been found guilty of a 
felony undergoes a screening to determine if they are in need of an 
assessment for a substance abuse disorder and/or a mental health 
examination.  If it is determined from the screening that further 
examination is necessary, the case is referred to the Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare for a full assessment.  As such, 
the defendant’s request for a psychological examination is 
unnecessary.   
 
(R., pp. 136-138.)   
 
On appeal Christofferson argues the district court abused its discretion 
because the purposes of an Idaho Code § 19-2524 evaluation and an evaluation 
conducted at a defendant’s request pursuant to Rule 12.2 are different.  (See 
Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-19.)  Christofferson claims they are different because a 
§ 19-2524 screening and evaluation are “mainly for the benefit of the district 
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court” whereas Rule 12.2 is “intended to aid the defendant in preparing a 
defense.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 18-19.)  Christofferson alleges that the district 
court did not recognize this distinction and thus did not act consistently with 
applicable legal standards.  (Id.)  Christofferson’s argument fails. 
While the underlying purposes behind Idaho Code § 19-2524 and Rule 
12.2 may be different, there is no substantive difference between what 
Christofferson requested in her particular Rule 12.2 motion and what is provided 
for under Idaho Code § 19-2524.  Christofferson’s Rule 12.2 motion sought 
funding for a “comprehensive psychological examination to assist for mitigation 
purposes at sentencing.”  (R., pp. 129-130.)  As the basis for her motion, 
Christofferson stated she had a “significant and complicated mental health 
history” with “potential” diagnoses.  (R., pp. 128-130.)  As found by the district 
court, however, Christofferson failed to establish the requested evaluation was 
necessary because, pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524, Christofferson would 
automatically undergo a mental health screening, and if necessary, a “full” 
psychological evaluation, for the court’s consideration at sentencing.  (See R., 
pp. 136-138 (citing I.C. § 19-2524).) 
Christofferson does not articulate how the mental health examination she 
requested and the evaluation contemplated by Idaho Code § 19-2524 actually 
differ.  She states on appeal, that their purposes are different but does not 
actually articulate how the end result of these two examinations would be any 
different.  Nor can she.  Idaho Code § 19-2524 mandates, “as part of the 
presentence process” in “every felony case,” “a screening to determine whether 
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a defendant is in need of…a mental health examination.”  I.C. §19-2524(1)(a).  
“Should the mental health screening indicate that a serious mental illness may 
be present,” the defendant must be referred to the Department of Health and 
Welfare for “further examination,” which must “include an in-depth evaluation” of 
a number of factors bearing on the defendant’s psychological condition. 
I.C. § 19-2524(a), (b)(i)-(vii).  A detailed report of the mental health examination 
must be provided to the court, “as part of the presentence report,” for the court’s 
consideration at sentencing.  I.C. § 19-2524(c).  There is no difference between 
the “comprehensive” psychological evaluation Christofferson requested and “in-
depth evaluation” contemplated by I.C. § 19-2524.  Both result in a complete 
evaluation of the defendant’s mental condition to inform the court’s sentencing 
decision.   
If prior to sentencing, Christofferson felt the Idaho Code § 19-2524 
examination that was ultimately conducted was inadequate, or if it raised 
additional mental health issues, there is nothing that prevented her either 
challenging that evaluation or from filing an amended 12.2 motion seeking 
additional mental health evaluations to help prepare her defense.1  Even if there 
were differences between the two examinations, those differences would not 
amount to an abuse of discretion.  While the purposes behind the rule and the 
statute may be different, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it 
                                            
1 At sentencing Christofferson’s counsel did address the inadequacy of the Idaho 
Code § 19-2524 evaluation that was prepared in this case.  (2/26/16 Tr., p. 71, L. 
24 – p. 77, L. 3.)  However, Christofferson does not raise this issue on appeal.  
Christofferson limits her appeal to the denial of the Rule 12.2 motion, which was 
made before the Idaho Code § 19-2524 evaluation was done.   
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determined that spending $5,000 to $10,000 for an additional psychological 
evaluation was unnecessary in light of Idaho Code § 19-2524.  (R., pp. 128-130.)  
Christofferson has failed to show the district court abused its discretion.   
 
D. Even If The District Court Abused Its Discretion, The Error Was Harmless 
 
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 
Christofferson’s Idaho Criminal Rule 12.2 motion for funding or a psychological 
evaluation for use as mitigation at sentencing because a psychological 
evaluation, if necessary, was already mandated by I.C. § 19-2524.  However, 
even if it did, the error was harmless.  Error is not reversible unless it is 
prejudicial.  See State v. Stoddard, 105 Idaho 169, 171, 667 P.2d 272, 274 (Ct. 
App. 1983).  Where the district court denies motion, the State has the burden of 
demonstrating that the error did not contribute to the district court’s decision.  
See State v. Stone, 154 Idaho 949, 959, 303 P.3d 636, 646 (Ct. App. 2013); see 
also State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221, 245 P.3d 961, 973 (2010).  Here, the 
decision to deny Christofferson’s Rule 12.2 motion did not contribute to the 
district court’s sentence.   
The district court’s sentence would not have been changed if there had 
been an additional mental health evaluation.  Christofferson killed Staci Shyrock.  
Prior to killing Ms. Shyrock, Christofferson was driving all over the road.  (R., pp. 
16-17.)  She crossed the centerline and crashed head on with the motorcycle 
ridden by Ms. Shyrock.  (R., pp. 14-17.)  Christofferson possessed a glass pipe 
with white methamphetamine residue.  (R., pp. 15-16.)  She also had a bottle of 
prescription Clonazepam pills.  (Id.; PSI, p. 5.)  Christofferson admitted to 
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smoking marijuana before she drove.  (R., p. 16.)  She also admitted that she 
used methamphetamine and prescription pills that same day.  (R., p. 32.)  The 
hospital tests showed that Christofferson had methamphetamine in her system.  
(2/26/15 Tr., p. 56, Ls. 5-14.)  Christofferson also had three prior convictions for 
possession of marijuana.  (PSI, pp. 9-10.)   
The district court also had information regarding Christofferson’s mental 
health at sentencing.  Attached to the PSI was the “GAIN-I Recommendation 
and Referral Summary (G-RRS).”  (See PSI, pp. 35-46.)  This report, based 
upon ASAM criteria, self-report and clinical observation, recommended that 
Christofferson be placed in a 24-hour supervised structured environment 
because she is “a risk of danger to herself and to others while under the 
influence[.]”  (PSI, p. 45.)   
Also attached to the PSI was a “19-2524 DHW Mental Health Examination 
Report.”  (PSI, pp. 47-49.)  The 19-2524 Mental Health Examination Report was 
“completed by licensed mental health clinician.”  (PSI, p. 47.)  Although the § 19-
2524 Report did not contain all of the information required by statute, it did 
include recommendations for treatment and incorporated the recommendations 
made in the GAIN report.  (PSI, p. 49.)  The district court found it had enough 
information.  (2/26/16 Tr., p. 95, L. 24 – p. 96, L. 16.)  The district court had 
information regarding Christofferson’s mental health when it made its sentencing 
decision.   
 It is not clear what additional information would have been contained in a 
second psychological evaluation.  However, even if the district court had 
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permitted an additional psychological evaluation, it is not clear whether 
Christofferson would have even wanted one.  After the PSI was completed, 
Christofferson informed her counsel that she did not want a psychological 
evaluation.  (2/26/16 Tr., p. 85, L. 17 – p. 86, L. 5.)  Christofferson’s counsel 
explained:  
[Christofferson] didn’t know until this morning that I was even going 
to go here.  I looked at this in depth yesterday, and, in particular, I 
do apologize.  Like I said, at one point in time we did ask for that 
psych evaluation because – and I know my colleague that 
represented [Christofferson] previous to me wanted to get that.  
And I guess when [Christofferson] told me she didn’t want one at 
that time, and that was after the PSI, I guess I decided I could live 
with that, but the more I looked at it, the more I decided I can’t.  I 
can’t live with a record that ignores this mental illness in the fashion 
that this particular alleged examination report does.  
  
(Id.)  Christofferson reiterated that she did not want an evaluation during 
allocution.  (2/26/16 Tr., p. 98, Ls. 19-22.)   
The district court examined the presentence investigation, the GAIN 
assessment, the I.C. § 19-2524 assessment, and the letter and the comments 
from the victim’s family and Christofferson’s family.  (2/26/16 Tr., p. 104, L. 22 – 
p. 113, L. 9.)  The district court specifically stated it was considering 
Christofferson’s mental health diagnosis in mitigation.  (2/26/16 Tr., p. 106, Ls. 2-
10.)  After weighing mitigating factors against aggravating factors, the district 
court sentenced Christofferson to ten years with five years fixed.  (2/26/16 Tr., p. 
105, L. 13 – p. 112, L. 23; R., pp. 153-158.)  This was two years less fixed time 
than the state recommended.  (2/26/16 Tr., p. 60, L. 21 – p. 61, L. 9.)   
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 
Christofferson’s motion for an additional psychological evaluation.  However, 
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even if it did, the error was harmless.  Christofferson pled guilty to voluntary 
manslaughter for killing Ms. Shyrock.  The district court’s sentence of ten years 
with five years fixed would not have been different if the district court had 




 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the 
district court.   
 DATED this 22nd day of November, 2016. 
 
       
 _/s/ Ted S. Tollefson____ 
 TED S. TOLLEFSON 
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